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Introduction  
The economic literature on the consequences of retirement is sizable. Although the marriage 
market has been the subject of numerous studies by economists since the pioneering work of 
Gary Becker, the relationship between retirement and marriage rates has been largely ignored 
in the literature to date. Recent media attention has been given in the US and the UK to the 
rise of the “silver splitters” as the number of people over 60 years of age getting divorced has 
risen by three quarters in just 20 years.1 Similar phenomena may be observed in other 
countries such as France. In this paper, we argue that retirement may affect individual 
marriage chances negatively, according to the predictions of quite standard economic models.  
 
Although, increases in divorces and remarriages at older ages have been studied thoroughly 
(Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007), the fact that retirement may affect marriage rates  has not yet 
been considered in the vast economic literature on marriage and divorce. Retirement from 
work likely involves changes in spouses’ bargaining power, household time allocation, health 
outcomes, and gender identity, all of which have been well documented to affect marriage and 
divorce (Grossbard-Shechtman, 1993; Akerlof & Krant, 2000; Bonsang et al, 2012).  The 
scant economic literature in this area focused on how wives' financial independence through 
pension rights may increase the risk of marital dissolution in the United States (Ono & 
Stafford, 2001) and how spousal social security rules in the United States may incentivise 
marriage durations or delay divorce (Dillender, 2014).2 
 
Since marriage (separation) and the timing of retirement may be endogenously determined,3 
we exploit the legal retirement age in France to instrument retirement in a model of  the 
individual  probability of being married (or divorced).  Using data drawn from the French 
Census, we show that the probability of retirement increases significantly and discontinuously 
at the legal retirement age of 60. In the case of France, like many other European countries, 
partial retirement is extremely rare and individual retirement is associated with a large drop of 
working hours to zero (Stancanelli, 2017), which results in an immediate and large change in 
                                                            
1 “'Til retirement us do part: 'silver splitter' divorces up by three quarters in generation”, The Telegraph, 06 
August 2013 
2 A study by Moen et al (2001) from the psychology literature explores the link between retirement and marriage 
quality, finding that retirement decreases marriage quality. However, no link to marital stability is drawn.  
3 A study by Bargain et al (2012) shows that access to divorce may change female labour supply decisions. 
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the household allocation of time (Stancanelli and Van Soest, 2012). We use the age-60 
threshold as an instrument for retirement. We thus assume that turning 60 does not directly 
affect marital status, other than through its effect on retirement. We argue that this is plausible 
as there are no other public policies that activate at age 60 in France. We find that retirement 
correlates negatively with the probability of men being married. This effect is larger for men 
with less than high school education, which includes the majority of the French population in 
the cohort we consider. We find no robust effect of retirement on the marriage probability of 
women.  
Contrary to the US, in France, male divorce rates actually increase in the level of education so 
that those without a high school diploma have a lower probability of divorce at all ages than 
those with a college degree. The fact that the marriage probability of this group correlates the 
most with retirement may fit a picture of changes in bargaining power and time allocation at 
retirement, negative effects of retirement on health outcomes, or gender identity “collapsing” 
at retirement. Indeed, individuals with lower education levels are typically more exposed to 
health shocks at retirement (Bloemen et al.,  2013), less involved in domestic work at all ages 
(Stancanelli et al, 2012)  and more attached to gender stereotypes (Akerlof and Kranton, 
2000), which become blurred at retirement.  
We find no correlation of female retirement and female marital rates. This is not surprising as 
if retirement makes marriages more fragile, as we argue here, this will happen when the 
husband, who is usually older than the wife, retires and he retires first. Moreover, all of the 
potential mechanisms we consider apply mainly to men. Indeed, the literature on the adverse 
effects of retirement on health and mortality have focused on men while the literature on 
changes in housework at retirement indicates that such increases are larger for men (Aguiar 
and Hurst, 2005; Stancanelli and Van Soest, 2012).   
The case of France appears especially interesting to study, as legal retirement age law 
provides a neat instrument for retirement. In addition to this, most workers in France only rely 
on public pensions (Bovenberg, 2011), which means that pension income is easy to anticipate 
by the worker and their spouse, as there is generally no complementary employer or other 
private pension. There are no spousal pension benefits either and health insurance coverage is 
universal and public (at all ages). Divorce law in France takes into account the future drop in 
income at retirement for individuals close to retirement age, and thus, there is no financial 
incentive to postpone divorce to retirement.  
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One concern with our research design is that, because age can be anticipated, divorce could be 
timed around the time of (husband’s) retirement as more time is available at retirement to file 
for divorce. However, we find no empirical evidence of such anticipation effects although we 
cannot completely rule them out. Also, there is evidence that women are the ones who often 
initiate divorce (Brining and Douglas, 2000) while our results indicate that it is husband’s 
retirement that precipitates divorce. Also, we find no empirical evidence of such anticipation 
effects.  
This paper is structured as follows. The economic mechanisms are discussed in Section 2. The 
institutional background follows in Section 3.  The data and empirical model are described in 
Section 4. Results are commented upon in Section 5 and robustness checks in Section 6.  The 
last section draws conclusions. 
1 THE EFFECT OF RETIREMENT ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE  
Pioneering economic models of marriage and marital instability were developed by Becker 
and Landes (1977) and Becker (1981). These hinge on the assumption that the marriage 
match between two given spouses produces some positive marriage surplus (such as extra 
consumption or love) that is enjoyed by the two spouses.4 Essentially, individuals marry if the 
expected returns from marrying their future spouse exceed the expected returns of remaining 
single and they may later separate if the value of being married to their current spouse falls 
short of the value of separating from their current spouse. Therefore, models of marriage and 
divorce are inherently dynamic, considering the expected value of marriage and its realization 
over two time periods (Peters, 1986) or employing a matching framework with a fixed 
number of marriageable types (Bruze et al, 2015). 
 
Each spouse’s expected value of marriage (versus that of being single) depends on the utility 
derived from (private and public) consumption, (the output of) household production and 
leisure, subject to a time and a budget constraint (Friedberg and Stern, 2003). There are 
several ways in which retirement may affect marriage and divorce.  
 
Traditional gender roles are challenged by retirement as male gender identity is strongly 
associated with market work (Akerlof and Krant, 2000). Recent work shows that male retirees 
                                                            
4  An extensive treaty of the economics of marriage is also provided by Grossbard (1993) and Friedberg and 
Stern (2003). 
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dramatically increase the time spent doing household work (Aguiar and Hurst, 2005; 
Stancanelli and Van Soest, 2012).  Retirement also negatively affects individual well-being 
(Bonsang, and Klein, 2012; Clark and Fawaz , 2009), health status and cognitive functioning 
(Bonsang et al, 2012). These changes may induce spouses to renegotiate the household 
allocation of time and the quantity of household production, changing the value of marriage. 
Last but not least, retirement may present individuals with new opportunities (outside 
options), for example through time reallocation to hobbies, that may increase the expected 
value of being single relative to the expected value of the current marriage.  
 
These changes in task allocation, gender identity health, cognition, well-being and outside 
options are unlikely to be perfectly anticipated prior to retirement. They represent margins 
which may affect the value functions for marriage and separation, changing the expected 
value of marriage compared to the value of separation, prompting marital dissolution upon 
retirement.  
 
On the other hand, in most countries, including France, pension offices have the obligation to 
inform people of pre-retirement age about their future pension income rights. Often, the 
employer’s human resources department also provides them with such information. In this 
way, individuals know well in advance what their income will be upon retirement. Therefore, 
as argued in more depth in the next section, changes in income are likely to be well 
anticipated and are unlikely to change the expected value of marriage at retirement in an 
abrupt manner.  
 
1.1 RETIREMENT IN FRANCE 
As far as retirement goes, 60 is the legal age at which most workers in France can retire with 
“maximum” pension benefits.5 Age 60 is also the ‘effective’ retirement age according to 
recent OECD estimates (OECD, 2014). This likely reflects the fact that pension benefits do 
not increase any further with employment after age 60 when individuals have sufficient years 
of social-security contributions. Particular sectoral agreements enable some workers to retire 
before 60, with “early” retirement often being at age 55, but these apply to only a minority of 
workers. By age 65, the law also requires most workers to retire if they have not yet done so.6  
                                                            
5 In 2010, this legal retirement age threshold was raised from 60 to 62, but with effect only in 2018. 
6  The 2010 reform also raised this age 65 threshold with effect from 2018. 
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We can therefore think of the French retirement system as a two legal retirement-age system, 
with a first threshold at 60 and a second at 65, although in practice the vast majority of 
workers retire long before 65. There is no detectable jump into retirement at age 65 for men, 
as there is at age 60 (Stancanelli, 2017).  
 
According to recent estimates, about 79 per cent of French retirees claim only a public (first 
pillar) pension, while 6 per cent also receive an occupational (employer-provided) pension 
and 18 per cent also have a private pension. The corresponding American figures are, 
respectively, 45, 13 and 42 per cent (Bovenberg, 2011). Periods of unemployment, sickness 
and maternity leave are all fully insured with 100 per cent coverage of pension rights. 7    
 
Retirement is often associated with a drop in household income, which is well anticipated. 
The rules concerning pension income are quite simple in France, as the pension payments are 
a specific well-known z fraction of the best n last years of earnings, with z  and n varying by 
sector of employment, duration of the pension contribution period (or employment seniority) 
and year of birth. Pension benefits are typically more generous for public sector workers, who 
can receive up to 75% of their average earnings in the last 10 (or, more recently, 20) years of 
work than for private sector employees, whose pension benefits are about 50% of past 
earnings. Since the drop in income can be anticipated and individuals can save towards their 
retirement, theory predicts that this margin should have little effect on marital stability 
(Becker and Landes, 1977).  
 
Retirement is an “absorbing” state: working hours drop to zero at retirement for the vast 
majority of workers (Stancanelli, 2017). There are no spousal (or dependent spouse) pension 
benefits. Only survivor pension benefits are available to widowed individuals upon the death 
of their retired spouse and these benefits are not lost upon separation or divorce, as long as 
individuals were married for at least four years (under the public pension plan) and did not 
remarry (for the private pension plans). Therefore, we do not have to worry about spouses’ 
social security in our empirical set up. However, we need to pay attention to the fact that the 
retirement decision may not be independent of the quality of marital life, as individuals who 
anticipate separating may have stronger labour market attachment and, therefore, postpone 
                                                            
7 Because breaks in employment not insured by pension contributions are often chosen by the individual, using 
the actual contribution period to identify eligibility for retirement (instead of the individual’s birthday) did not 
appeal to us. Furthermore, this measure is not available in the Census data which we use. 
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retirement. Alternatively, their marital life may affect their productivity at work and 
employers may want to encourage them to retire as early as possible. Therefore, we exploit 
the discontinuity in individual retirement at the legal retirement age to instrument retirement 
in a model of the marriage probability.  
1.2  DIVORCE LAW IN FRANCE 
Consensual divorce laws date back to 1975 in France and divorce rates soared thereafter.8 
Figure 1 (based on administrative data on divorcees collected by the French Ministry of 
Justice) illustrates large increases in the proportion of French older divorcees (as a proportion 
of the married population) over the last few decades, particularly older male divorcees,9 and 
similar patterns have been shown to hold in the US (Brown & Lin, 2012) and the UK (Office 
for National Statistics, 2013). French administrative data on marriage break up rates by the 
duration of the marriage reveal that, by the end of the nineties, as many marriages broke up 
after 30-34 years of duration as after the first five years of marriage (Figure 2). Because 
individuals marry on average in their late twenties/early thirties and retire in their sixties, this 
suggests that retirement years may have become critical for marriage stability. 
 
 
                                                            
8 A recent reform (2004) further eased divorce procedures in France. 
9 There are notable spikes in divorce rates both after the introduction of consensual divorce (1975) and a recent 
reform (2004) that eased further divorce procedures in France. For each older age group, there are many more 
divorces for men than for women, which is explained by the fact that men marry (and divorce) on average 
younger women.    
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Figure 1 Divorced French persons by year of the divorce and age of the divorcee (as a 
proportion of the married population by gender in the same year). Source. French Ministry of 
Justice. 
 
 
Figure 2 Divorced French persons by year of the divorce and duration of the marriage (as a 
percentage of the married population in the same year). Source. French Ministry of Justice. 
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2 DATA AND METHOD 
We use the French Census Data for year 1999, whose coverage was universal Samples of 1/20 
or 1/4 of the population are publicly available to researchers from the French National 
Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). To be able to create cells large enough 
for robust analysis, we opt for the 1/4 of the population data, which corresponds to around 
14.5 million people. The Census provides data on age (in days), employment, type of 
contract, work duration, marital status and household type. In principle, more recent years of 
Census data could be used. Census data collection became annual starting in 2004. However, 
the new format of the survey results in samples of just 1/20 of the population each year. Thus, 
to rely on a sample as large as possible (as only a small percentage of the population of any 
age separates in any given year), we carry out our main analysis on the 1999 Census. The 
Census is cross-sectional in nature so that we cannot follow individuals over time. 
Furthermore, we cannot link individuals to their spouses. Sample selection is as follows: we 
retain those aged between 50 and 70 who declare themselves to be currently working or to 
have formerly been workers.10 We also exclude those who declare themselves to be of a 
nationality other than French in case retirement provokes return migration. 
2.1 OUTCOMES  
We define three alternative outcome variables: marries, divorced and living alone. The 
variables “married” and “divorced” are extracted from the question on marital status in the 
Census questionnaire. The individual self-declares himself as single; married (or remarried); 
widowed or divorced. The variable “married” is set to 1 for all those who chose married and 0 
for those who chose single or divorced. The variable “divorced” is set to 1 for those who 
declare to be divorced and 0 for those who declare to be married or single. The variable 
“living alone” is defined as follows. In the Census questionnaire, the individual is asked about 
their living arrangements and chooses among: child of a couple; child of a single parent; 
member of a couple (with or without children); single parent; living away from home (in a 
shared residence) and living alone. Those who select one of the latter three options are classed 
as “living alone”.   
 
                                                            
10 That is to say, actif ayant un emploi or ancien actif. 
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2.2 SUMMARY STATISTICS  
 
Summary statistics for our selected sample from the 1999 Census data are shown in Table 1 
for men and women aged 50-70. The average age of men and women is 59 and 59.5 
respectively. Around 46% of men are employed, with the vast majority (94%) of these 
working full-time. 44% of women work but only 71% of these are working full-time. 54% of 
men are retired while the same figure for women is 56%. There are large gender differences in 
the probability of being married for the subsample of 50-70 year olds. 81% of men are 
married while just 66% of women are married. Many more women live without a partner than 
men (33% compared to 19%) where living alone is defined as living without a partner (single, 
separated, widowed and divorced are included in this group). Just 8% of men are divorced 
while 11% of women are divorced. Almost half of the sample of 50-70 year olds observed in 
1999 are high school “dropouts”, meaning that they do not have a diploma higher than 
elementary school. Another two-fifths have a high school diploma as their highest 
qualification while 15% of men and 12% of women have a third level qualification.  
Table 1 Summary statistics for 50-70 year olds from 1999 French Census Data 
 
2.3 EMPIRICAL MODEL 
The legal retirement age in France is 60. This means that a large proportion of the population 
will retire at exactly 60 but not everyone. We are, therefore, in the case of a “fuzzy” 
Men Women
Age 59.0 59.5
Employed 0.46 0.44
Full‐time 0.94 0.72
Part‐time 0.06 0.28
Retired 0.54 0.56
Married 0.81 0.66
Living alone 0.19 0.33
Divorced 0.08 0.11
Widowed 0.03 0.14
Highschool dropout 0.41 0.48
Highschool  0.44 0.39
College 0.15 0.12
N 1,361,943 1,183,043
Sample (from 1999 French Census) is aged 50‐70 and self‐declared to be currently 
working or to be a former worker. Living alone is defined as not living with a  partner. 
Highschool dropouts have no highschool diploma. Highschool refers to those with a 
highschool qualification. College refers to those with third level qualifications.
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Regression Discontinuity design (FRD) which Hahn et al (2001) have shown is comparable to 
an Instrumental Variables (IV) set-up.  However, as age 60 has been the retirement age in 
France for a long time and individual can anticipate this, though we test for anticipation 
effects and we find none, we still opt for discussing our results in terms of statistical 
correlations. Following Lee and Lemieux (2010), in the case of an FRD design, we can write 
the probability of retirement as  
 
ܲሺܴ ൌ 1|ܺ ൌ ݔሻ ൌ ߛ ൅ ߴܶ ൅ ݃ሺݔ െ ܿሻ 
 
where R is a dichotomous variable indicating retirement, X represents the running variable, 
age, ܶ ൌ 1|ܺ ൒ ܿ| indicates whether the running variable exceeds the threshold, c, which is 
60 years of age. This design can be described by the two-equation system: 
 
ܯ ൌ ߙ ൅ ܴ߬ ൅ ݂ሺܺ െ ܿሻ ൅ ߝ 
 
ܴ ൌ ߛ ൅ ߜܶ ൅ ݃ሺܺ െ ܿሻ ൅ ݒ 
 
M is a dichotomous variable indicating marriage. The statistical correlation between marriage 
and retirement  is, ߬,  which is estimated by instrumenting the dummy, R, with T (passing the 
age threshold for retirement eligibility).  
 
An exclusion restriction is also required. Reaching the retirement age cannot impact marriage 
probability discontinuously except through its impact on the treatment probability 
(retirement). As there is no other large policy which kicks in at age 60, apart from retirement, 
we expect this to be the case. However, as discussed in more detail in Section 2, retirement 
has been shown to affect many other outcomes (income, health, time allocation, well-being) 
so that the statistical correlation of retirement and the probability of being married that we 
estimate may be interpreted as a composite correlation t of all of these factors which our data 
and set-up does not allow us to distinguish between.   
 
We will estimate this system as a linear probability model, both by polynomial regressions 
estimated by Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) with robust standard errors and by 
local linear regressions using a variety of bandwidths and a rectangular kernal. A battery of 
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robustness tests as well as an investigation into potential anticipation effects will also be 
conducted. 
 
3 RESULTS 
3.1 GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS 
Before looking at the results from the model described in the previous section, we show some 
graphical results. The definition of our outcome variables is described in detail in Section 4. 
The main outcome variable that we use is married. This is a self-declared status. We also 
show results from two alternative dependent variables in the Appendix. Divorced is also a 
self-declared status and living alone is defined as living without a spouse i.e. the individual 
reports that they do not live in a couple. The sample we retain for our analysis is that of 
workers and retirees aged between 50 and 70. 
We plot in Figure 3 the raw probability among our sample of being in employment in France 
in order to illustrate the downward jump in employment levels at age 60.  The 95% 
confidence intervals are constructed using the sampling variance of employment levels by age 
and a fractional polynomial line is fitted to these cell means.  
At age 50, almost all of the subsample of workers and retirees are in work. This figure 
steadily decreases with age with around 40% of men and 50% of women still in employment 
at age 59. A large drop in employment rates (to around 20% for both men and women) is 
observed between age 59 and 60 and this proportion continues to decrease until it is close to 
zero at age 65. Therefore, reaching the legal retirement age induces over half of the working 
population to retire at exactly age 60.  
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Figure 3 The probability of being employed by age using Census 1999 
Next, we plot in Figure 4 the raw probability of being married by age, along with the 95% 
level confidence bounds, using our selection of working or retired individuals from the 1999 
Census. The left hand side graph shows results for men. Marital probability is increasing for 
men between age 50 and 55, at which point it becomes somewhat flatter. A clear decrease in 
the probability of being married is apparent for men at age 60, the legal retirement age. 
Importantly, this drop is unusually large compared to other bumps in the curve away from that 
threshold and is of a magnitude of about 1 ppt. The right hand side graph shows the same plot 
for women. The marriage probability of women is decreasing slowly from age 50 to 60 and 
continues decreasing at a faster rate after age 60. In contrast to men, there does not seem to be 
a sharp change in the probability of women being married at age 60.  
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Figure 4 Probability of being married by age (measured in years) using Census 1999 data.  
Figure 5 shows the same plot with age measured in quarters rather than in years. This figure 
displays more noise due to the fact that the age cells are smaller so we allow different scales 
on the male and female y-axis to allow the discontinuity to be clearly seen. The decrease in 
marriage probability for men at age 60 is confirmed and the drop is still unusually large 
compared to other bumps in the curve away from the discontinuity.  
 
Figure 5 Probability of being married by age (measured in quarters) using Census 1999 data. 
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3.2 MODEL RESULTS 
In this section, we build on the graphical results from the previous section and present the 
results of a reduced form econometric model of marriage, described in Section 5. The 
dependent variable is self-declared marital status. The statistical correlation we are after is 
that between the probability of retirement and the probability of being married. In each 
specification, the first it is instrumented with a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if 
the individual has reached the legal retirement age (60) and 0 otherwise. Additional 
explanatory variables in both the first stage (the retirement model) and the second stage (the 
marriage model) are limited to a polynomial in age (measured in quarters). . This model 
(equivalent to a fuzzy design RD model) is first estimated parametrically by GMM and then 
non-parametrically using local linear regression with a range of bandwidths and a rectangular 
kernal. Table 2 shows the results. Column (1) shows the results of a fuzzy design RD model, 
estimated by GMM using a quadratic polynomial in age. Column (2) shows the results of a 
fuzzy design RD model, estimated by GMM using a cubic polynomial in age. Column (3) 
shows GMM results using a cubic spline in age i.e. different slopes are allowed on each side 
of the discontinuity. Columns (4) – (6) show non-parametric estimates of the first stage and 
the treatment effect using local linear regression and a number of bandwidths, equivalent to 2, 
3 and 4 years. Column (7) also shows local linear regression estimates using the optimal 
bandwidth as defined by Imbens & Kalyanaraman (2012). 
We notice that the first stage estimate of the effect of being aged 60 on retirement is always 
statistically significant for both men and women. Turning 60 increases the probability of 
being retired by 16-41 percentage points (depending on the specification) for men and by 13-
40 percentage points (ppt, hereafter) for women.  
Turning next to the second stage equation, results show that retirement correlates negatively 
with the probability of being married and this correlation corresponds to a reduction of n 4-7 
ppt for men in the marriage probability. The size of this statistical correlation is relatively 
stable and statistically significant across empirical specifications. There is no robust finding 
for women which is consistent with the fact that no change in female marital status was 
observed at age 60 in Figures 4 or 5. More generally, this finding is consistent with the fact 
that if retirement affects marital stability, on average, the husband is the oldest spouse in the 
couple (Bloemen and Stancanelli, 2014) and the first to retire.  
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Table 2 The statistical correlation between retirement and marriage 
 
3.3 VARYING THE SAMPLE SIZE 
To check the robustness of our results to the sample selection used in the previous section, we 
re-run the analysis for narrower age-groups. In a first instance, we select 55-65 years olds and 
in a second instance, we select those aged 57-63. We present, in Table 3, the results from the 
most flexible specifications.  
The statistical correlation between retirement and marriage probability for men is of a similar 
magnitude when we use these smaller samples. The size of this ranges from -6 to -8 ppt with 
all coefficients but one being statistically significant. Results for women are also unchanged. 
We observe no correlation of female retirement with marriage probabilities. 
A. Census 1999 
Men
Retirement ‐0.04 *** ‐0.05 ***  ‐0.06 *** ‐0.06 *** ‐0.07 *** ‐0.06 *** ‐0.06 **
0.00 0.01  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
First stage  0.41 *** 0.24  ***  0.16 *** 0.17 *** 0.16 *** 0.16 *** 0.26 ***
0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 1,361,943 1,361,943  1,361,943 1,361,943 1,361,943 1,361,943  1,361,943
Women
Retirement 0.04 *** 0.01  0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
0.00 0.01  0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.08
First stage  0.40 *** 0.26  ***  0.21 *** 0.18 *** 0.19 *** 0.21 *** 0.13 ***
0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 1,183,043 1,183,043  1,183,043 1,183,043 1,183,043 1,183,043  1,183,043
(6)
The dependent 
variable is self‐reported marriage. Age is measured in quarters. Retirement is 
instrumented with reaching the legal retirement age (60) and a polynomial of age is included in columns (1)‐(3). The local linear are non‐
parametrically estimated.  
Local linear regression
BW = 1.5
(7)
GMM 
Quadratic Cubic  Cubic Spline BW = 8 BW = 12 BW = 16
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)
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Table 3 The statistical correlation of retirement and marriage for 55-65 year olds and 57-63 
year olds  
 
3.4 MEASURES OF  MARITAL STABILITY 
The results detailed previously used self-declared marriage as the primary outcome variable. 
In this section, we discuss the results from two alternative outcome variables: divorce and 
living alone. Divorce is self-declared in the same way as marriage. Living alone is a variable 
which we construct to indicate whether or not an individual lives with a partner (see Section 
3.1). As dissolving a marriage can take some time to complete from a legal standpoint, we 
expect this variable to pick up the effect of retirement on living arrangements, which may 
change in anticipation of divorce.  
Men
Retirement  ‐0.07 *** ‐0.08 *** ‐0.07 ** ‐0.07 ‐0.06 ***  ‐0.06 ***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
First stage 0.17 *** 0.16  *** 0.14 *** 0.13 *** 0.17  ***  0.17 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
N  614,236  360,948 614,236 360,948 614,236  360,948
Women
Retirement  0.02 0.00  0.00 0.06 0.00  0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
First stage 0.22 *** 0.19  *** 0.16 *** 0.14 *** 0.18  ***  0.18 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
N  509,393  295,467 509,393 295,467 509,393  295,467
  The dependent variable is self‐reported marriage. Age is measured in quarters. Retirement
 is instrumented with reaching the legal retirement age (60) and a polynomial of age is included in 
columns (1)‐(4). The local linear specifications are non‐parametrically estimated with a bandwidth of 8 quarters. Robust standard errors
are used. 
Cubic  Cubic Spline
Age 55‐65  Age 57‐63 Age 55‐65 Age 57‐63
Age 55‐65 
BW = 8
Local linear regression
Age 57‐63 
BW = 8
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Figure 6 The probability of living without a partner by age using Census 1999 
 
Figure 7 The probability of being divorced by age using Census 1999 
Figures 6 and 7 show graphical evidence of the discontinuity of both living alone and being 
divorced at the legal retirement age. For men, the probability of living alone jumps by around 
1 ppt at age 60 (similar to the decrease in the probability of being married) and the probability 
of being divorced jumps by around 0.5 ppt. For women, we observe no evidence of a 
discontinuity in the probability of living alone or of being divorced at the legal retirement age.  
Results from the same models described in Section 6 are shown in the Appendix for the two 
alternative outcome variables. Table 5 shows results for the same models using divorce as the 
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dependent variable. The statistical correlation between retirement and  divorce is positive in 
all specifications ranging from 2 to 4 ppt. This is a slightly smaller magnitude than the 
correlation of retirement and the  marriage probability (-4 to -7 ppt). This is unsurprising as 
divorce is a lengthier process than separation so we expect that self-declared divorce rates 
change slower than self-declared marriage rates once separation occurs.  
Table 6, which displays the results for the outcome variable living alone shows that the 
likelihood of living without a partner  correlates positively (corresponding to an increases by 
between 2 and 5 ppt) for men who retire. For women, the results are a little noisier. Some 
specifications show a negative correlation between retirement and the likelihood of women 
living alone but these are not robust across specifications.   
3.5 HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS  
 
Figure 8 The probability of being married for 50-70 year olds who live with their children 
using Census 1999 
Many economic studies have concluded that children significantly affect marital stability in 
many different ways (see Vuri (2001) for a review of the literature). The presence of children 
in the family home may change the effect of retirement on martial stability. Therefore, we plot 
in Figure 8 the probability of being married for men and women observed in the 1999 Census 
who still have children living in their home. This graph can be compared to Figure 4 which 
depicts the same picture for those with and without children living at home. Figure 8 shows 
that individuals who have children living at home are more likely to be married at all ages. 
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Further, we note that there is no effect of the discontinuity at age 60 on the probability of 
being married for individuals living with their children, indicating that the presence of 
children may “dampen” the shock to the utility of marriage which retirement can result in.  
As living alone after retirement may have different implications for poverty depending on 
lifetime earnings we next look at the difference in the statistical correlation found between 
retirement and marriage probapility for different education groups which are likely to have 
different profiles of lifetime earnings. We define three education groups. The group 
“dropouts” has no highschool qualification. The group “highschool” has at least some form of 
highschool qualification (at least a “Brevet”). The group “college” has some form of 
postsecondary education. Results for a selection of specifications using the 1999 Census data 
are displayed in Table 4.  
Results for men indicate that much of the pattern observed in the whole population comes 
from the group of high school dropouts. Retirement correlates negatively with  the marriage 
probability of male high school dropouts (corresponding to a drop of  around 8-11ppt). The 
corresponding figure for those with some high school qualification is 1-3 ppt but this is 
statistically significant in only one parametric specification (cubic polynomial in age). There 
is no statistical correlation between retirement and the marriage probability of college 
educated males. Given that high school dropouts have a lower divorce probability at all ages 
than college educated men (6.5 per cent versus 9 per cent at age 59), it is interesting to note 
that their marriage stability should be more affected by retirement.  
Results for women indicate that, if retirement does affect their marriage probability, it does so 
only for college educated women. However, this finding is not robust across specifications. 
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Table 4 The statistical correlation between retirement and the marriage probabilities of 
different education groups
 
4 FURTHER ANALYSIS 
4.1 ANTICIPATION EFFECTS 
Anticipation effects are a concern in any RD study which uses age as the running variable 
because age is perfectly anticipated and individuals may, therefore, adjust their behaviour 
prior to reaching the age threshold which is used for policy analysis. Therefore, we present 
and discuss our results in terms of statistical correlations.    
In our study, anticipation effects could make the interpretation of the retirement effect 
difficult if, for example, individuals who are already in unstable marriages before they turn 60 
“wait” until they are retired to separate.  
There are a couple of ways in which we can check if this kind of anticipation effect might be 
driving our results. Firstly, since there is evidence that women are most often the ones that 
initiate separation or divorce (Brining and Douglas, 2000) and that, in most couples, the wife 
is on average younger than the husband (the average age difference between spouses in our 
sample being about two and a half years), if divorce were timed when either the woman or, 
even, both spouses have the time available to file for divorce, than one would expect to find a 
Men
‐0.08  *** ‐0.03  *** ‐0.02 ‐0.11 *** ‐0.02 ‐0.04 ‐0.09 ** ‐0.01  ‐0.11
(0.01)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.07)
First stage  0.27 *** 0.22  *** 0.22 *** 0.17 *** 0.15 *** 0.13 *** 0.17 *** 0.17 ***  0.13 ***
(0.00)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01)
N 563,263 597,421 201,259 563,263 597,421 201,259 563,263  597,421 201,259
Women
Retirement 0.00 0.03  * ‐0.09 ** 0.02 0.05 ‐0.04 ‐0.11 0.03 ‐0.04
(0.01)  (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05)  (0.10)
First stage  0.31 *** 0.20  *** 0.21 *** 0.24 *** 0.17 *** 0.17 *** 0.13 *** 0.17 ***  0.15 ***
(0.00)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01)
N 573,440 465,587 144,016 573,440 465,587 144,016 573,440  465,587 144,016
College 
BW = 8
GMM Local linear regression
The dependent 
variable is self‐reported marriage. Age is measured in quarters. Retirement is 
instrumented with reaching the legal retirement age (60) and a polynomial of age is included in columns (1)‐(4). The local linear 
specifications are estimated non‐parametrically. 
Highschool 
BW = 8
Cubic 
Spline 
Highschool
Cubic 
Spline 
College
Dropout 
BW = 8
Cubic 
Dropouts
Cubic 
Highschool
Cubic 
College
Cubic 
Spline 
Dropouts
Retirement 
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larger increase in separation rates when the wife retires than when the husband retires. From 
our estimations, we note that this is not the case. Marital instability seems to arise only in 
response to male retirement, when the wife is unlikely to have reached the retirement age.  
We can also look at the pre-age 60 trends for a number of groups whose marital stability we 
consider to be more or less affected by the legal retirement age. For example, it is plausible 
that full-time workers who retire may experience a larger shock to their marriage utility than 
part-time workers, as a larger amount of time suddenly becomes available for reallocation to 
leisure or home production to the full-time than to the part-time workers, or because health 
shocks associated with retirement may be smaller for part-time than for full-time workers. 
Part-time workers also have more time at their disposal before retirement to deal with the 
administrative burden of marital dissolution. The marriages of individuals who are inactive 
prior to the legal retirement age should be least affected by reaching the retirement age. 
Without suitable panel data, we cannot compare the marriage probabilities of these groups 
before and after the age threshold. However, by comparing the pre-60 marriage trends for 
these three groups of people, we can check if there seems to be an anticipation effect for full-
time workers compared to part-time workers or the inactive. If this were the case, we would 
observe a marriage probability which increases at a faster rate (or decreases at a slower rate) 
for full-time workers who approach the age of 60 compared to part-time or inactive people 
who approach the age of 60.  
Results are displayed in Figure 9. In the right and left hand graph, the black line shows the 
marriage probability for inactive individuals, the gray line shows the trend for part-time 
workers and the purple line shows the trend for full-time workers. For men, we find that the 
probability of being married is highest for full-time workers, followed by part-time workers 
and the inactive. This is true for all ages between 50-60. While the age-trends for part-time 
workers and the inactive are quite similar, the trend for full-time workers is flatter, the 
opposite of what we would expect if full-time workers were delaying their marriage 
dissolution until age 60. For women, we find that the inactive have the highest marriage rates, 
followed by full-time and then part-time workers. However, for each of these groups, the age 
trend is similarly flat, showing no evidence of anticipation effects for full-time or part-time 
workers.  
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Figure 9 The probability of being married for 50-60 year olds who work full-time, work part-
time or are inactive 
These arguments do not definitively preclude the possibility that the effect which we measure 
is (partly) a delay in marriage dissolution until retirement. However, given these arguments, it 
is likely that at least some of the effect which we identify captures a pure increase in marital 
dissolution, rather than just a change in the timing of marital dissolution.  
  
5 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
The economic literature on the consequences of retirement is sizable. Leaving employment 
increases opportunities for leisure and may reduce stress, leading to a longer lifespan. 
However, leaving employment can also reducing mental and physical activity, social 
interaction and encourage more unhealthy behaviour, such that delaying retirement may 
actually extend the lifespan. Retirement has been found to affect health and well-being both 
positively and negatively, depending on occupation type and whether or not the retirement 
was voluntary. Retirement has also been found to dramatically increase the amount of house 
work performed by retired men but not to greatly affect the amount performed by retired 
women, as women are often the main providers of unpaid work in the household, regardless 
of their employment situation.  
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This paper studies the effect of retirement on individual marriage status, an issue which has 
received scarce attention in the economic literature. We argue that retirement may affect the 
value of marriage for a number of reasons. Retirees immediately need to reallocate a huge 
amount of time and this cannot be done ahead of retirement. In addition, retirement may result 
in shocks to well-being, health, cognition and outside options. The combination of these 
unanticipated shocks may result in a change in the expected value of marriage following 
retirement.  
Because the individual decision to retire from work may not be independently determined 
from marriage stability, we exploit the legal retirement age in France to instrument the effect 
of retirement on marriage stability. Nevertheless, as individual may anticipate turning 60, we 
interpret our results in terms of statistical correlations. Using data drawn from the French 
Census, we show that the probability of retirement increases significantly and discontinuously 
at the legal retirement age of 60. Using this threshold as an instrument for retirement in a 
fuzzy RD design, we find that retirement correlates negatively with the probability of men 
being married. These results are robust to a number of empirical specifications, to a number 
of measures of marital stability and to robustness checks including narrowing the age window 
examined. We find no evidence of anticipation effects although we cannot completely rule 
these out. The statistical correlation found  is larger, in absolute value, for low educated men. 
We find no significant correlation between retirement and the the marriage probability of 
women. Our results are somewhat in line with the small literature on the effect of 
unemployment on divorce, which indicates that men becoming unemployed significantly 
increases their probably of divorce while the same is not true for women becoming 
unemployed (Doiron & Mendolia, 2011; Banzhaf, 2018). 
Being single at the end of the life cycle is economically undesirable. Single or divorced 
individuals present more physical and mental health problems than married individuals and at 
least part of this difference is attributable to the stress associated with loneliness and marital 
dissolution. Marital breakdown may lead to increased elderly poverty and reliance on social 
transfers as single (or newly separated) individuals do not benefit from the economies of scale 
which sharing a household provide and have less resilience to output shocks. There is also an 
increased risk of a lone elderly person becoming a burden on hospitals and hospices later in 
life if there is no spouse to care for them. The group for which we find the largest association 
between retirement and marital stability, low educated men with no children living at home, 
may be most vulnerable to these economically undesirable effects.  
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For these reasons, among others, policies which ease transitions to retirement could be 
considered in order to reduce the shock which retirement has on the value of marriage. Such 
policies, which could include more flexible working hours in the years prior to and after the 
legal retirement age and the deployment of social security or welfare agencies to advise 
workers on how to plan their time use after retirement, could decrease the effect of retirement 
on marital instability.  
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10. APPENDIX 
Table 5 The statistical correlation between retirement and  the probability of divorce 
 
 
A. Census 1999 
Men 
Retirement  0.02 *** 0.02  ***  0.04 *** 0.04 *** 0.04 *** 0.04  ***  0.03
0.01 0.01  0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01  0.02
First stage  0.24 *** 0.24  ***  0.16 *** 0.17 *** 0.16 *** 0.16  ***  0.15 ***
0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.01
N=  1,361,943 1,361,943 1,361,943 1,361,943 1,361,943 1,361,943  1,361,943
Women
Retirement  ‐0.04  *** ‐0.02  ***  ‐0.02 ‐0.01 ‐0.01 ‐0.02 ‐0.04 *
0.00 0.01  0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01  0.02
First stage  0.40 *** 0.26  ***  0.21 *** 0.18 *** 0.19 *** 0.21  ***  0.17 ***
0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.01
N=  1,183,043 1,183,043 1,183,043 1,183,043 1,183,043 1,183,043  1,183,043
(6)
BW = 1.5
(7)
Local linear regression 
The dependent variable 
is self‐reported "divorced". Age is measured in quarters. Retirement is instrumented with
reaching the legal retirement age (60) and a polynomial of age is included in columns (1)‐(3). The local linear specifications are estimated  non‐parametrically .
Robust standard errors are used. 
GMM
Quadratic Cubic  Cubic Spline BW = 8 BW = 12 BW = 16
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)
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Table 6 The statistical correlation between retirement and the probability of living without a 
partner 
 
A. Census 1999 
Men 
Retirement  0.02  *** 0.04  ***  0.04 ** 0.04 * 0.05 *** 0.05  ***  0.05
0.00  0.01  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02  0.03
First stage  0.41  *** 0.24  ***  0.16 *** 0.17 *** 0.16 *** 0.16  ***  0.15 ***
0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.01
N=  1,361,943 1,361,943 1,361,943 1,361,943 1,361,943 1,361,943 1,361,943
Women
Retirement  ‐0.05 *** ‐0.02  ** ‐0.03 * 0.00 ‐0.01 ‐0.02  ‐0.01
0.00  0.01  0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02  0.03
First stage  0.40  *** 0.26  ***  0.20 *** 0.18 *** 0.19 *** 0.21  ***  0.17 ***
0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.01
N=  1,183,043 1,183,043 1,183,043 1,183,043 1,183,043 1,183,043 1,183,043
(6)  (7)
BW = 1.5
Local linear regression
The dependent variable is 
self‐reported "living alone" meaning not living with a partner. Age is measured in months. Retirement 
 is instrumented with reaching the legal retirement age (60) and a polynomial of age is included in columns (1)‐(3). The local linear 
Specifications are estimated non‐parametrically. 
Robust standard errors are used. 
GMM 
Quadratic Cubic  Cubic Spline BW = 8 BW = 12 BW = 16 
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)
